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Banks v HMRC: human rights and relief for 
political donations 
Introduction  
Although the interaction between domestic tax laws and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) was once something of a rarity, in recent decades the two have 
come into contact with increasing frequency. In particular, domestic taxation law 
impacts on property rights (real and personal), and such laws have to be respectful of 
such rights, avoiding disproportionate restrictions and tax encumbrances. It is, however, 
unusual for tax laws to come into conflict with rights to freedom of expression and 
association. 
Recently the First-tier Tax Tribunal has decided that the requirement in section 
24(2) of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA) for a political party to be represented in 
the House of Commons before donations to it were exempt from inheritance tax 
discriminated against parties with significant support but insufficient Parliamentary 
representation. This, in the Tribunal’s view was contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR 
which prohibits discrimination, in conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention, which guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions and 
property. However, although the Tribunal noted that there were other means of 
demonstrating significant public support available to the law, which would not have a 
disproportionate effect, it also stressed that the choice of those less restrictive means 
was a matter for Parliament and not for the Tribunal. Accordingly, as the Tribunal was 
unable to re-write the legislation, the taxpayer's appeal against assessment to 
inheritance tax in respect of gifts to the political party was dismissed. 
This case is relevant not only for tax lawyers, but also those interested in the 
law relating to political association and the regulation of political parties and their 
affairs. It is also of significance to human rights lawyers in terms of how those laws 
have to comply with principles of legality, proportionality and the prohibition of 
discrimination. 
The facts and decision in Banks  
The taxpayer, and companies with which he was connected, made donations of almost 
£1 million to the UK Independence Party (UKIP) between October 2014 and March 
2015.  HMRC assessed him to inheritance tax on the basis that the donations did not 
qualify for exemption under section 24 IHTA as gifts to qualifying political parties, 
because such parties are required to have at least one Member of Parliament1 elected at 
the last general election preceding the transfer of value. UKIP had no candidates elected 
as MPs at the last general election, although it had been successful in other ways2 and, 
                                                 
1 IHTA 1984 s. 24(2).To qualify a party must have one MP and 150,000 votes or two MPs elected at 
the last general election. 
2 The Tribunal acknowledged that: (1) UKIP secured a greater proportion of the popular vote at the 2010 
General Election than other parties that succeeded in having candidates elected; (2) at the time of some 
of the donations, there were two UKIP MPs i.e. two by-election wins; (3) at all material times, UKIP 
was a registered political party under the Registration of Political Parties Act 1998 or the Political Parties 
Referendums and Elections Act 2000; (4) at the time of the donations, UKIP was widely represented on 
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by the time of the transfer, did in fact have two MPs3 following by-election victories in 
late 2014. The taxpayer maintained that the requirement of the section 24(2) exemption 
for a political party to be represented in the House of Commons was contrary to his 
rights under the Convention and relevant EU law, arguing that its application in his case 
involved discrimination contrary to Article 14 together with Article 1 of the First 
Protocol, and/or Articles 10 and 11, which guarantee, respectively freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly and association. 
The Tribunal held first that in principle the tax provisions fell within Article 1 of the 
First Protocol as they deprived the person concerned of a possession, namely the 
amount of money that had to be paid.4 Thus, it was common ground that any potential 
discrimination arising from the application of section 24(2) fell within the ambit of that 
Article.5 It then noted that there was a difference to the donor between the tax treatment 
of a gift made to UKIP and one made to another, qualifying,  political party.6 However, 
it was then necessary for the taxpayer to demonstrate that the differential treatment that 
he had suffered was based on one of the proscribed grounds in Article 14.7 In this case, 
the differential treatment of which the taxpayer complained was discrimination on the 
grounds of his political opinion within Article 14.8 As a result of this finding, the 
Tribunal held that it was not necessary to decide whether Articles 10 and 11 ECHR 
(Freedom of expression and association and assembly) were engaged or breached, nor 
whether UKIP's ECHR rights had been breached or whether the taxpayer could rely on 
such a breach. Further, the taxpayer could not rely on Article 4(3) of the EU Treaty 
which did not create any directly enforceable right. 
 
The Tribunal then considered whether the discriminatory treatment was 
objectively justified and whether it was proportionate to any legitimate aim that the 
statutory provision sought to achieve. In this respect the Tribunal stated that the correct 
approach was to determine whether, after weighing all relevant factors, the measure 
adopted achieved a fair balance between the public interest being promoted and the 
other interests involved.9 In the Tribunal’s view, political opinion, expressly referred to 
in Article 14, was a sensitive ground of discrimination10 in relation to which cogent 
                                                 
local councils; (5) UKIP candidates had been elected to the European Parliament at the preceding 
election, with the largest proportion of the popular vote of any UK party at those elections, and had more 
elected members of the European Parliament than any other UK political party. 
3 The successful UKIP candidates were Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless. 
4 Banks v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2018] UKFTT 617, at 24. 
5 Banks, above fn. 4 at 24; following Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 51. 
6 Banks, above fn. 4 at 26. 
7 Banks, above fn. 4 at 27; following Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] 
UKSC 47. 
8 Banks, above fn. 4 at 46. It then held (at 57) that if that was wrong, the taxpayer's status as a supporter 
of UKIP was not some "other status" for the purposes of Article 14, because the "other status" had to 
exist independently of the discrimination of which the person complained, following R (Clift) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 54. The Tribunal also found that the 
taxpayer was in an analogous position to others who did not suffer the taxation on their political gifts, 
namely those individuals who made gifts to the Labour Party or the Conservative Party. 
9 Banks, above fn. 4 at 71-76, and applying the Supreme Court decision in Recovery of Medical Costs 
for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill, Re [2015] UKSC 3. 




reasons are required for any differential treatment.11 This notwithstanding, the Tribunal 
acknowledged that tax was an area in which due deference had to be shown to the 
legislature.12 In the present case, the legislation pursued a legitimate aim as the 
exemption in section 24(2) was designed to ensure that a potentially valuable tax relief 
was limited to prevent abuse However, the chosen means for achieving the aim was 
disproportionate and the requirement for representation in the House of Commons did 
not strike a fair balance in the context of the provision of tax relief for the funding of 
political parties. This was because other means of demonstrating significant public 
support were available which would not have a disproportionate effect on new political 
parties or those without representation.13 
Having made that determination, and considering what remedy was available to 
the parties, the Tribunal stated that section 24(2) could not be re-written under section 
3 of the HRA 1998 so as to remove the restriction on the availability of relief. That 
would go against the grain of the legislation, as its legitimate aim was to limit relief to 
political parties that enjoyed a level of public support. Although the section could be 
re-written to be compliant, that was a matter for Parliament and not for the Tribunal.14 
Further, the Tribunal did not have power to make a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 4 of the 1998 Act,15 and its powers were thus limited to determining whether 
the assessment should be upheld.16 
Accordingly, as the Tribunal was not able to re-write the legislation, the 
taxpayer's appeal was dismissed.17 
Commentary: challenging tax legislation on human rights grounds 
Under the HRA 1998 domestic courts are not allowed to strike down or disallow 
primary legislation that cannot be reconciled with the rights laid down in the 
Convention. However they are allowed, under section 4 of the Act, to declare both 
primary and secondary legislation incompatible with the substantive rights of the 
ECHR. In this case, however, the Tribunal, had no power to make a declaration under 
the Act, as only the High Court and above have such a power. Consequently, the only 
remedy available to the claimants was to ask the Tribunal to re-interpret the legislation, 
under section 3 of the 1998 Act, to make it Convention compliant, or to make a simple 
determination that the legislation discriminated against the taxpayers, contrary to 
Article 14 in conjunction with their rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention.  
In this case, the Tribunal was unable to re-interpret s. 24 in a way which would 
make it Convention compliant because that would clearly have gone against the clear 
                                                 
11 Banks, above fn. 4 at 93. Citing R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] 
UKHL 37 and R (M) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] UKHL 63. 
12 Banks, above fn. 44 at 98; following International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158. 
13 Banks, above fn. 4 at 115-117. 
14 Banks, above fn. 4 at 128-129. 
15 Such a power is restricted to the High Court and above: s.4(5) Human Rights Act 1998. 
16 Banks, above fn. 4 at 129. As a result of the finding, the Tribunal held that it was not necessary to 
decide whether Articles 10 and 11 ECHR (Freedom of expression and association and assembly) were 
engaged or breached, nor whether UKIP's ECHR rights had been breached or whether the taxpayer could 
rely on such a breach. Further, the taxpayer could not rely on Article 4(3) of the EU Treaty which did 
not create any directly enforceable right. 
17 Banks, above fn. 4 at 161. 
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intention of Parliament as expressed in the words of the Act. It would amount to a 
legislative act and a usurpation of Parliament’s duty to re-write the legislation.18 The 
provision needed to be, and was capable of being, re-written (for example by applying 
the tax benefits to all political donations) but that task had to be performed by 
Parliament not the courts. 
The other aspect of the decision which has relevance to human rights law is the 
Tribunal’s approach to deciding whether a prima facie discriminatory provision was 
capable of being objectively justified. This, as the Tribunal correctly pointed out, is an 
area where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is prepared to offer a wide 
area of discretion, especially once it is satisfied that there is a legitimate reason for the 
provision’s enactment.  
For example, in Burden and Burden v United Kingdom,19 the ECtHR stressed 
that states enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in respect of levying taxes where a 
balance needed to be struck between the requirement to raise revenue and issues of 
social policy as the states themselves are in the better position to judge how that balance 
should be struck. It refused to interfere unless a taxation scheme was manifestly without 
reasonable foundation or was discriminatory under Article 14. The fact that the state 
could have drawn the dividing line at a different place did not in itself amount to 
discrimination.20 
In the present case the Tribunal was prepared to take a less deferential approach 
and felt that the measure of public support for a political party should not be restricted 
to its representation in the House of Commons. This seems a very brave decision for a 
Tribunal to come to: one which questions Parliament not only on the content of taxation 
law, but also on exactly how it accords benefits to political parties. The Tribunal rightly 
refused to legislate and lead on what these new measures would be. It is certainly 
possible that whilst the higher courts and the ECtHR, which do possess formal powers 
to challenge domestic law, might nevertheless extend Parliament wider discretion here 
than the Tribunal is suggesting. On the basis of Burden, it is likely that the ECtHR 
would decide that Parliament was acting within its margin of appreciation by applying 
a criteria which matched the electoral system employed in the state. The iniquity of this 
system, and the lack of proportional representation in that system, is discussed below 
but, whether it would be the ECtHR’s role to question legislation which reflects it is 
doubtful.21 
The case also raises issues of democracy and political participation more 
broadly. New parties in particular may attract significant support, for example UKIP in 
recent years, but this support is too dispersed across the country to win parliamentary 
seats. It is of particular note that UKIP received over 900,000 votes in the 2010 General 
                                                 
18 See Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467. 
19 Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 51. 
20 The decision was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court (2008) 47 EHRR 38. 
21 Moreover, the voting system in Parliamentary elections was subject to a referendum in 2011, in which 
almost 68% of voters opposed changing the electoral system from first past the post to the alternative 
vote. See F. McGuinness and J. Hardacre, ‘Alternative Vote Referendum 2011: Analysis of Results’, 
House of Commons Library Paper 11/44. 
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Election but returned zero MPs, in contrast to seven other political parties that received 
fewer votes but returned at least one MP.22 
In that respect, the Tribunal acknowledged that the fundamental requirement for 
parties to have had MPs elected at the previous general election, before donations to 
that party would be exempt from inheritance tax, had to be considered in light of the 
UK’s electoral system. According to the Tribunal, the first past the post voting system 
– i.e. that the winner takes all – is “not, on its own, a reliable barometer of public 
support”, meaning that the section 24 test is “liable to be prejudicial to supporters of 
new and as yet unrepresented parties even where those parties can demonstrate 
meaningful levels of public support.”23 
Such a test may have been easier to justify in previous decades, when the 
political landscape was more stable and the two main political parties were able to 
achieve working parliamentary majorities.24 In the contemporary political landscape 
the test is more difficult to justify when the principal argument in support of the first 
past the post system – that it returns strong parliamentary majorities – appears harder 
to achieve. Moreover, with opinion polling regularly indicating that the two main 
parties are neck and neck, the fact that smaller parties struggle to progress has prompted 
some to argue that the present electoral system is in need of reform.25 Ultimately, as the 
Tribunal acknowledged, the section 24 test, which has to be considered in light of the 
first past the post voting system, preserves the status quo, arguably frustrating the ability 
of individuals to realise the full extent of their political rights. 
In that respect, although not considered in the Banks case, the obligation upon 
states to “hold free elections…, under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”, as guaranteed by Article 3 
of the First Protocol to the ECHR, is uneasy to reconcile with the resulting situation. 
On the one hand, the ECtHR has stressed that states are granted a wide margin of 
appreciation when it comes to organising and running electoral systems, which reflects 
the historical development, cultural diversity and varied political thought that exists 
throughout Europe.26 However, on the other hand, it has also stressed that measures 
taken by contracting parties must not curtail the right to vote in a way that impairs its 
essence and effectiveness; the conditions imposed must be proportionate and pursue a 
legitimate aim; the free expression of the people must not be thwarted; the requirement 
must be concerned with the integrity and effectiveness of the election process; and, if 
relevant, the exclusion of any group of the public must be reconcilable with the purpose 
                                                 
22 BBC News, Election 2010: National Results available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/election2010/results/ [Accessed 4 January 2019].  
23 Banks, above fn.4 at 115. 
24 Prior to the 2010 General Election which resulted in a hung Parliament and the formation of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, the last election which did not return a 
parliamentary majority was in February 1974 when Harold Wilson’s Labour Party secured the most seats, 
albeit fewer votes than the Conservative Party, but not enough seats to form a majority government. 
25 See, for example, Electoral Reform Society, The 2015 General Election: A Voting System in Crisis 
(July 2015) available at https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/the-
2015-general-election-report/ [Accessed 4 January 2019] and The 2017 General Election: Volatile 
Voting, Random Results (August 2017) available at https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-
and-research/publications/the-2017-general-election-report/ [Accessed 4 January 2019]. 
26 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium (1988) 10 EHRR 1 at [52]; Labita v Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 50 
at [201]; Hirst v. UK (2006) 42 EHRR 41 at 60-61. 
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of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention.27 As such, it might be questioned 
whether section 24 of the IHTA, and the electoral system which is integral to that 
provision, can be defended in light of those fundamental principles. 
Furthermore, the decision in Banks draws attention to questions about tax relief 
for donations to political parties more generally. Few reliefs exist for donations to 
political parties under UK tax law. Section 24 IHTA is one of only two explicit 
deductions from UK taxes for donations to political parties.  
Further relief exists under section 260 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 
1992 (TCGA). Under section 260 TCGA, donors can avoid paying capital gains tax on 
assets by transferring them directly to a political party. As section 260 TCGA directly 
imports the definition of a political party from the IHTA this provision (presumably) 
also falls foul of the ECHR.  
Nevertheless, it is increasingly common for donations to political parties to be 
made via companies, with such donations being deducted from the donating company’s 
profits, thus reducing the company’s liability for corporation tax.28 As a general rule, 
company expenditure must be “wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade” 
of the company,29 and (presumably) donations to political parties are regarded as good 
for business. Alternatively, however, it is arguable that in circumstances in which a 
company is wholly or largely controlled by a single director (as is the case in Banks) 
such donations amount to benefits in kind under section 203 of the Income Tax 
(Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 and ought, therefore, to be chargeable against that 
director’s personal income tax. 
The Tribunal in Banks acknowledged that the aim of section 24 IHTA, and its 
predecessors, is to provide relief for donations to political parties that meaningfully 
participate within national political debate and to prevent such a relief from being 
abused. However, the case brings the relative inconsistency of the UK’s tax law with 
respect to donations to political parties into sharp focus. 
Having concluded that section 24 IHTA is not compatible with Convention 
rights, the Tribunal proceeded to consider alternatives. One alternative proposed by the 
claimant was the inclusion of all parties registered under the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000, however, the Tribunal considered that this approach would 
go “against the grain” of the legislation.30 The question of which parties should qualify 
for tax relief was considered by the Neill Committee in 1998. The Committee 
concluded that the existing test was the correct one, recognising that 
“[i]f tax relief is given to all registered parties, some organisations might register 
as parties simply to be able to claim tax relief. In our view, the inheritance tax 
                                                 
27 See in particular Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt (1988) 10 EHRR 1; Hirst (2006) 42 EHRR 41; Yumak 
& Sadak v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 4; Sitaropoulos & Giakoumopoulos v Greece (2013) 56 EHRR 9; 
Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) (2013) 56 EHRR 19. 
28 This, presumably, was the rationale for the fact that most of the value of Banks’ donations being 
made through his company, Rock Services Ltd, and not as an individual.  
29 s54 Corporation Tax Act 2009. 
30 Banks, above fn.4 at 127. 
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test provides a mechanism for ensuring that a tax relief scheme for political 
parties is not abused.”31  
In 2016, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in his Autumn Statement 
that  
“[f]rom Royal Assent of the Finance Bill 2017-18, inheritance tax relief for 
donations to political parties will be extended to parties with representatives in 
the devolved legislatures, as well as parties that have acquired representatives 
through by-elections.”32 
The Chancellor acknowledged that the measure is necessary to achieve consistent and 
fair treatment for all national political parties with elected representatives.33 
Nevertheless, the Finance Bill 2017-18 was introduced on 1 December 2017 and 
contained no such measure. 
Conclusions 
The decision of the Tribunal in Banks is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, it is 
comparatively rare for tax laws to come into conflict with Convention rights, given the 
wide margin of appreciation usually present with respect to fiscal matters. Second, it 
illustrates how the relief under section 24 IHTA has not kept pace with the development 
of UK politics in the decades that have followed its enactment, as the Chancellor 
acknowledged in 2016. Third, and most significantly, it requires the Treasury to redraft 
section 24 IHTA in order to comply with the decision of the Tribunal. 
If the Treasury does, indeed, revise section 24 IHTA, it may, in doing so, be 
worth re-examining the question of tax relief for donations to political parties more 
broadly. At present, relief is only available from a very limited range of taxes which 
are normally only ever paid by a small minority of taxpayers. Relief for donations to a 
broader range of political parties, against a broader range of taxes, may prove to be a 
more equitable basis for supporting donations towards legitimate political activity.  
 
Ben Stanford, Stuart MacLennan, and Steve Foster* 
 
                                                 
31 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Standards in Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in 
the United Kingdom (HMSO, 1998) Cm 4057 at 99. 
32 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2016 (HMSO, 2016) Cm 9362 at 37. 
33 HM Treasury, above fn. 32. 
* Coventry Law School. 
